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A B S T R A C T
As successive reports have predicted tens or even hundreds of millions of people displaced by climate change in the coming decades, the politics of climate migration
has moved to the forefront of contemporary public discourse. In particular, those least able to adapt and most vulnerable to exploitation have garnered media and
policy attention. Nevertheless, analysis of this phenomenon is inhibited by the large scale, predominantly unidirectional nature of the phenomenon's social scientific
analysis, leaving the power laden nature of resource and infrastructure persistently underplayed. In particular, how the geography of natural resources produces
different patterns of (im)mobility in response to environmental change, even within the same community, remains poorly understood.
Drawing on data gleaned from a multi-sited study of rural and migrant livelihoods in Cambodia, this paper highlights how the small scale, power-laden geography
of water resources and irrigation shapes migration in response to the changing climate. Using brick workers as a case study of ‘hyper-precarious’ migrant labour, it
uses quantitative, qualitative and spatial data to show how the socio-economically situated geography of water influences both perception of the climate, and
mobility in response to it. Viewing this resource landscape as a form of hydrosocial power, the paper overarchingly makes a case for enhanced communication
between the climate migration and hydrosocial power literatures, in order to better conceptualise the role of power in articulating the linkages between water
geographies and climate mobility.
1. Introduction
How people respond to climate change is one of the key questions of
our era. Millions of people are subject to ongoing shocks to their live-
lihoods as a result of its effects, often inducing them to move elsewhere
to earn money or seek safety. Consequently, climate migration is
adopting an increasingly central place in public discourse. Scientific
journals and the quality press alike proclaim a coming ‘wave of climate
migration’ (Scientific American, 23/03/ 2018: 1) and that ‘climate
change will create the world's biggest refugee crisis' (The Guardian,
2017), whilst advocacy groups proclaim ‘a growing global crisis’
(Arcanjol, 2018, p. 1) in which ‘every second, one person is displaced
by disaster’ (IDMC, 2017).
Indeed, so global has the discourse of climate migration become,
that smaller scale lenses on its manifestation have tended to be mar-
ginalised in the literature. Relatively few studies have explored how
community scale resource geographies structure the (im)mobility in
response to the climate and fewer still have considered these processes
through the lens of power. Drawing on the experiences of rural people
subject to high level of environmental vulnerability, this paper argues
that a smaller scale, geographically embedded, perspective needs to be
taken on the drivers of climate migration.
As shown here, changes to the climate are not experienced directly,
but via the articulated geography of livelihoods and resources. To un-
derstand both what motivates and what results from climate migration,
therefore, it is necessary to adjust the scale at which it is perceived.
Rather than viewing climate response as a global, national, or regional
phenomenon, this paper shows it to be rooted in both small scale re-
source geographies and the wider structures of power in which they are
situated.
Moreover, by analysing rural conditions associated with entry to
various occupations, it is shown here that this socio-economically and
geographically embedded perspective on climate migration is necessary
to understand not only the drivers, but also the outcomes of climate
migration. Specifically, the paper uses a detailed focus on bonded la-
bour in the brick industry as an example of how entry to hyper-pre-
carious migrant labour (Lewis, Dwyer, Hodkinson, & Waite, 2015) may
be engendered by the articulated experience of the climate. Finally, by
framing these processes from the perspective of hydrosocial power
(Boelens, 2014; Meehan, 2014; Uson et al., 2017), this paper explores
how the spatial, institutional and economic conditions that structure
climate migration are rooted both in the specifics of local geography
and wider process of development.
This paper therefore makes three contributions. First, it uses quan-
titative, qualitative and spatial data to show how the perception of the
climate is influenced by the usage of, and geographic positioning in
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relation to, irrigation. Secondly, it highlights the efficacy of these socio-
geographically articulated climate perceptions in determining migration
incidence at the community scale. Finally, it highlights the combined
role of irrigation and climate perception in shaping the outcomes of
migration, taking a detailed analysis of hyper-precarious brick worker
rural livelihoods as a lens through which to interpret the conditions
shaping entry to the worst forms of migrant labour.
In elucidating these points, the paper will begin by framing the
concept of hydrosocial power within the wider literature on climate
migration. Subsequently, sections on methodology and contextual
framing will precede two empirical sections. The first of these, section
5, examines the small scale geography of climate change perception,
highlighting how it manifests at intra-village scale and through the lens
of livelihoods. Section 6 then considers how the use and accessibility of
irrigation structures migratory decision making in relation to the cli-
mate, before bringing these perspectives together, to consider how the
community scale geography of irrigation structures migration out-
comes, in some cases promulgating entry to brick work, a hyper-pre-
carious form of migrant labour.
2. Linking climate migration and hydrosocial power
That climate change is driving water scarcity in parts of the world is
well established (Bates, Kundzewicz, & Wu, 2008; Mekonnen and
Hoekstra, 2016), yet views differ as to the human response to these
changing conditions. Adaptation scholars have emphasised the ability
of communities to manage such risks and scarcities, whilst proponents
of climate conflict models have pointed to the role of water in fuelling
current conflicts (Gleick, 2014; Swain, 2004) and warned of the
mounting potential for future ones (Carius, 2006; Conca, 2006; Gleick,
1993). Nevertheless, each viewpoint has limitations. Both the adapta-
tion (Hulme, 2011) and water conflict (Lipschutz, 1997) literatures
have been accused of deterministic reasoning, with a more structural
(Böhmelt et al., 2014; McDonald et al., 2014), translocal (Greiner &
Sakdapolrak, 2013) and multi-scalar (Selby and Hoffmann, 2014)
analysis of climate response having been called for in each case. Space
and power are, in other words, underplayed in the climate migration
literature.
Historically, this has been true also of the literature on resources
more generally. Indeed, though described in 2004 as being ‘at the top of
the global agenda’ (Khagram, 2004), the study of water nevertheless
remains ‘a rather dispersed field of research, organised in strongly re-
gionally and sector-wise defined clusters, apart from being dis-
ciplinarily divided’ (Mollinga, 2009, p. 8). Each has its own char-
acteristic approaches, but a consistent influence in the literature has
been Thomas Homer-Dixon's seminal work on environmental scarcity
and violence (1991; 1994; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell, & Rathjens, 1993),
which has ‘received considerable attention since at least the late 1990s’
(Ide, 2015, p. 61).
This perspective has given rise to a sub-set of the literature focusing
specifically on the institutional management of water in regions char-
acterised by physical, but especially armed, conflict. Key country and
area focused studies have in recent years been undertaken in Syria by
Gleick (2014), the Middle East by Zeitoun (2008) and Selby (2003) and
– more broadly – “Asia, Africa and the Middle East” by Swain (2004),
whilst an additional area of literature has begun to explore in more
detail the institutional conditions that engender and mediate conflict.
Pahl-Wostl and Kneiper (2014), for example, have explored the efficacy
of polycentric governance surrounding international water manage-
ment, whilst McDonald et al. (2014), Zografos et al. (2014), and
Azhoni, Holman, and Jude (2017), have considered it in relation to
infrastructural development and state led climate adaptation respec-
tively.
Nevertheless, recent trends within adaptation scholarship have
begun to see it bring power more centrally into the analysis of climate
response, raising the possibility of a productive analytical nexus. Just as
the adaptation literature has begun to consider how institutions and
power relations structure responses to climate change (Adger, 2001;
Adger, Huq, Brown, Conway, & Hulme, 2003; Kelly and Adger 2000;
O'Brien et al., 2007; Ribot 2011) and posit means by which those sys-
tems might be transformed to facilitate desired outcomes (Eriksen,
Nightingale, & Eakin, 2015; Pelling 2011), culture and power have
become a feature of water conflict study (Böhmelt et al., 2014; Ide,
2015).
From this position, a steady stream of papers, beginning with Budds
in 2004 and continuing with Goldman (2007) and Bonsch et al. (2015),
have critiqued the neoliberal, self-interested ‘hydrocracies’ that govern
water at a macroeconomic scale (Molle et al., 2009, p. 341). Viewed
thus, the history and geography of water infrastructure are therefore
also the history of the development of the state, a longitudinal per-
spective on power posited most famously by Eric Swyngedouw (2015,
pp. 1898–2010; 1997), but later developed by a range of authors
(Suhardiman, 2018; Taylor and Trentmann, 2011; Zografos et al., 2014)
seeking to understand how the ‘social character of water’ (Castro, 2006,
p. 11) is co-opted into the ‘organised encroachment of the powerful’
(Hackenbroch & Hossain, 2012, p. 417), via both state sized and also
household scale (Adams, 2018; Barnes, 2014; Delgado & Zwarteveen,
2007) geographies.
By tracing the state's extension and emergence in this way, scholars
of hydrosocial power have therefore sought to disrupt the dualism be-
tween its human and physical dimensions by moving ‘away from
thinking of water as a discrete resource or utility’ (Allon & Sofoulis,
2006) towards the idea of water as a field of power and tool of dom-
inance (Khagram, 2004). By reinserting the ‘polis’ into water politics
(Menga, 2017), they argue, contemporary water management frame-
works are an exertion of control over the hydrosocial cycle (Boelens,
2014; Joshi, 2015), but meet and conflict with existing hydrosocial
frameworks, creating tensions which manifest across humans and
landscape (Koehler et al., 2018).
Such approaches have added much needed subtlety to the analysis
of how water, land and power interact and co-produce each other.
Nevertheless, they have remained generally static, engaging relatively
little with the recent literature on climate migration (e.g. Ahmed et al.,
2019; Ingham, 2019; Kelman et al., 2019; Parsons, 2019; Porst and
Sakdapolrak, 2018; Suliman, 2019, pp. 1–21; Tuitjer, 2019; Zander
et al., 2019) despite growing calls by scholars to engage with power in a
similar manner. This relatively untested nexus therefore offers an op-
portunity to move away from the climate migration field's traditional
dominance by large scale mono-factoral models (Gómez, 2013), which
have tended to adopt a binary (move/doesn't move), and adminis-
tratively defined conceptions of mobility (see e.g. Smith, 2001; Henry
et al., 2003; Barrios, Bertinelli, & Strobl, 2006; Van der Geest, 2010;
Kniveton et al., 2012 for examples of studies on rainfall and migration).
This is a longstanding issue. Indeed, as commentators on climate
migration (e.g. Baldwin et al., 2014; Bettini, 2013) have argued, this
binary approach to field is rooted in the historic distinction between
minimalist and maximalist approaches to the issue (Suhrke, 1994). Yet
it is one subject to growing scrutiny in recent years, as a wave of new
social science research has begun to explore the political (Cresswell,
2010) and cultural (Adger, Barnett, Brown, Marshall, & O'brien, 2013)
dimensions of climate migration. From this perspective, not only are
‘the lived experiences [of climate change]… extremely diverse’ (Abbott
& Wilson, 2015, p. 1), but mobility itself is ‘a resource that is differ-
entially accessed’ (Cresswell, 2010, p. 21), rooting climate migration
firmly within multi-scalar geographies of power.
In conceptual terms, what this demonstrates is that mobility does
not occur in direct response to the aggregated geophysical phenomena
by which climate change is measured, but rather local weather events,
as they are socially, culturally and economically articulated in place. In
a manner increasingly familiar to human geographers, therefore, en-
vironmental phenomena are being reconceptualised as ‘experienced by
the actors involved’ (Long, 2008, p. 39), rather than predetermined
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geographic ontologies. This is a perspective which has spawned key
practical innovations. Recent years have seen a growing focus on risk
perception as an intermediary factor in mobility (Adger, 2010; Blaikie,
Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 2014; Brouwer, Akter, Brander, & Haque,
2007; Johnson and Covello, 2012; Pidgeon et al., 2003) and translocal
studies have worked similarly to interrogate and reformulate ‘orthodox
views of space as bounded and coherent territory’ (Collins, 2012, p.
318).
What renders this perspective especially relevant is its ability to
conceptualise linkages between the impact of the climate – as articu-
lated via social, and local physical geographies – and the outcomes of
this impact in terms of migration. This is a task that has often been
undertaken in manner that fails to account for the complexity of climate
migration outcomes (Middleton et al., 2018). Moreover, it has tended to
be undertaken in a depoliticised manner, eliding the role of structural
and multi-scalar inequalities in shaping these outcomes (Cote &
Nightingale, 2012; Nightingale, 2017). By exploring how the small
scale social and physical geography of the community shapes distinct
migrant outcomes, therefore – including the ‘extreme forms of migrant
labour exploitation’ described as ‘hyper-precarious’ by Lewis et al.
(2015: 582) and exemplified here through brick work – the aim here is
draw closer conceptual linkages in this respect.
Overarchingly, the aim of this paper is therefore to highlight how
small scale geographies of water shape mobility in response to the en-
vironment. In doing so, it will first demonstrate how migration in re-
sponse to the environment is undergirded by climate perception – es-
sentially the climate as it is articulated within a milieu of assets,
livelihoods and social structures – rather than the direct manifestation
of the climate itself. Secondly, it will demonstrate the undergirding role
played by the geography of water in shaping climate perceptions.
Finally, it will demonstrate the role played by water geography in
shaping the incidence and outcomes and migration.
3. Methodology
This paper constitutes part of a wider project examining how cli-
mate change impacts on migrant worker livelihoods in Cambodia. Via a
contextual focus on bonded labour in the brick industry, the project
addresses how the debts accrued as a result of Cambodia's increasingly
unpredictable climate induce former and current smallholding farmers
to migrate from rural villages to work in debt bondage in Cambodia's
brick kilns (Brickell et al., 2018). In addition, it seeks to explore how
the sender side conditions leading hyper-precarious migrants such as
brick workers to migrate differ from those promulgating migration into
alternative occupations.
Seeking to provide linked data on origin and destination conditions,
the data presented here were collected using a two-stage research
method. First, a set of 51 semi-structured interviews were undertaken
with brick workers, alongside 31 with kiln owners, union leaders,
former kiln workers, neighbours, and Buddhist monks. This first phase
collected data on the lived experience of brick work and the conditions
that induce people to enter it, whilst also compiling a list of candidate
villages in which to conduct rural research. From a shortlist of seven
sender villages, each reporting high out migration to the brick kilns,
three were selected for further analysis in phase two.
During this second phase, a total of 308 quantitative surveys were
conducted in three sender villages. Village A: Svay, is located in
Kampong Cham province, around 50 km from the centre of Phnom
Penh and around 20 km from the brick production sites visited in phase
one. Village B, Cheik, and Village C: Poum, are in Prey Veng province,
located between 80 and 100 km from Phnom Penh and the brick pro-
duction sites.
In each village, all households with members working in the brick
industry, and a randomised sample of those without, were surveyed on
livelihoods, assets, and the experience of the climate. A spatial di-
mension, in which the location of surveyed households was recorded
and that of any agricultural land established using a gridded map and
landmark method in which enumerators were trained, was also in-
cluded. These data were subsequently plotted and GPS data recorded.
These GPS coordinates and the survey data with which they are asso-
ciated were subsequently analysed using ArcGIS to produce the maps
included here.
Finally, further qualitative work with farmers and local officials was
undertaken to ground survey data in qualitative accounts. Throughout
the research process, qualitative interviews were conducted in Khmer
and transcribed into English, whilst quantitative data were collected
and recorded in Khmer by a trained native speaking research team.
4. Climate change, development and hydrology in Cambodia
Cambodia has in recent years been much lauded for achieving rapid
economic growth in the course of its transition from a closed, state
controlled economy under the People's Republic of Kampuchea to one
of the most open economies in one of the world's most open regions
(TRAC, 2013). Driven by a two hundredfold expansion of the garment
industry since the early 1990s (ILO, 2015), the Kingdom's GDP is almost
ten times larger today than in 1993 (World Bank, 2018).
Nevertheless, these spectacular figures have come at a cost.
Cambodia has one of the fastest rates of deforestation in the world,
driven in large part by the unfettered provision of government land
concessions since the late 1990s (Scurrah and Hirsch, 2015), which
have ‘decimated’ (Lawreniuk, 2017) vast swaths of the country's for-
estry and agricultural livelihoods through deforestation and land use
change on a vast scale (Davis, Yu, Rulli, Pichdara, & D’Odorico, 2015;
Global Witness, 2015). Nevertheless, even amidst the enormous scale of
these processes, a closer focus is necessary. Alongside major land con-
cessions, an equally important process of land redistribution has re-
sulted from the agglomerative effects of far smaller scale economic
processes.
Indeed, from an initial position in which land redistributions un-
dertaken by the People's Republic of Kampuchea during the 1980s left
the country with an unusually equitable distribution of agricultural
smallholdings, Cambodia's development has proved its own land
grabber. Market forces, spatially embedded in the landscape via the
mass labour migration that has transformed national livelihoods, have
engendered land redistribution, land use change, and ecological de-
gradation on an enormous scale. Debt, in particular, has underpinned
this process. Microfinance has boomed, contributing to a mean house-
hold debt ten times larger than it was only a decade ago (Bateman,
2017) and remittances – predicated on high levels of migration to the
modern sector (UNESCO, 2018) have transformed the rural economy,
tripling rural wages (IBRD and World Bank, 2015) and resulting in a
nationwide shift towards capital intensive, debt funded agriculture
(Liese et al., 2014).
Alongside these political economic and environmental changes,
Cambodia's recent development has been intertwined with one of the
world's highest levels of climate change vulnerability (Kreft et al.,
2016). Now routinely described as ‘a major threat’ to the economy and
society of Cambodia (Khut, 2017), climate change is increasingly cen-
tral to questions of inequality, poverty and development in the
Kingdom (Halsnaes et al., 2018). Moreover, as well as greater un-
predictability, historical records indicate a shift away from the tradi-
tional bi-modal distribution of rainfall since the 1920s, towards a single
rainfall peak centred on October (Diepart et al., 2015), substantially
shifting the amenability of the environment to smallholder agriculture.
Faced with these changing conditions, the idea of adaptation has
been enthusiastically adopted by the Cambodian government (RGC,
2013) as an essential strategy for rural Cambodians (Nang et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, the weather data necessary to interpret the climactic
changes underway in Cambodia have been acknowledged by the World
Bank and others to be ‘lagging behind’ (UNISDR, 2010, p. 5) others in
the region. In general, ‘rainfall is only rarely recorded, even on days
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with heavy thunderstorms’ (The Phnom Penh Post, 2015: 1), thereby
providing a picture of climate change at odds with farmers' reported
experiences (Touch et al., 2017). Moreover, it is a picture rooted firmly
in existing structures of power (Nightingale, 2017), with the only
properly maintained weather stations usually positioned in close
proximity either to the geographic or urban centre of each province.
As a result of challenges in both data and administrative capacity,
the RGC has adopted an explicitly laissez faire approach to the chal-
lenges posed to Cambodia's farmers (Chea, Nang, Whitehead, Hirsch, &
Thompson, 2011). Yet despite the absence of functional state led sys-
tems of water management (CEDAC, 2009), community led adaptation
has been widespread in recent years. In little more than a decade, the
country has transitioned from the traditional transplanting method of
farming – wherein seedlings are raised in a nursery plot before re-
planting – to a system of broadcasting, in which seeds are scattered
directly onto larger plots (Shrestha et al., 2018). As a result, the labour-
intensive transplanting method, requiring around 30 labour days per
hectare, has been replaced by a broadcasting system requiring only one
fifteenth of the labour, but a great deal more capital (Liese et al., 2014).
Notwithstanding government efforts to encourage more capital in-
tensive farming, farmers' accounts of their transition demonstrate
considerable agency in the process of agricultural decision making. In
their own words, ‘no one told us [to change]. We did it ourselves be-
cause growing long-term rice takes too much time, and growing short-
term rice takes only 3 months so we can cultivate it faster’ (Farming
Focus Group, Cheik, 22/02/2018). Yet examining farmers' motives in
greater detail reveals the influence of changing community hydrology.
As informants across all three villagers explained, mirroring wider na-
tionwide findings by Thomas et al. (2013), the unpredictability of
rainfall in recent years had played a significant role in the need for
greater flexibility in the dates of cultivation, engendering a preference
for the three month growing period of short grain rice over the six
month growing period of long grain rice:
‘When I was a child the weather was comfortable. In the past time,
rain came only in the rainy season, but nowadays rain also comes in
the dry season. It's difficult doing rice farming [now], because
whenever we need a lot of water for the rice field, there is no rain,
and when we don't need water, there is a lot of rain. For example,
after transplanting we needed water to keep the seedlings alive, but
there was no rain’ (Mother of Brick Workers, Svay, 08/02/2018)
The resultant transition from the labour intensive transplanting
method of farming to the capital intensive broadcasting method re-
quires only 1/15th of the labour investment, but a great deal more
capital, in the form of fertilisers, pesticides and seeds. Moreover, it
requires water in large quantities, engendering a shift mirrored across
Asia more broadly whereby ‘large centrally managed schemes are
giving way to individually managed small-scale pumping from canals,
river, aquifers and on-farm ponds’ (Johnston et al., 2013). This ‘water
scavenging economy’ (Johnston et al., 2013, p. 4) is made possible by
the availability and affordability of small portable pumps (Molden,
2007), but it is also predicated on the presence of existing water in-
frastructure to be repurposed for private use, thereby allotting ageing
Khmer Rouge infrastructure a key role in the process of small scale
agricultural intensification in many sites.
Cheik, Poum and Svay are three examples of such repurposing.
Located in the highly populated Mekong floodplains to the south of
Cambodia, the soil type, water resources and topography led Khmer
Rouge governors to plan paddy extension and intensification in the area
surrounding each site. Contrary to much scholarship on the issue, these
projects were not homogenously designed, but tailored to the geo-
graphy of each site (Tyner et al., 2018). Reflecting their slight elevation
and thus relatively low propensity to flooding, therefore, the areas in
which these three sites are situated were subject to vast irrigation
projects such as the one shown in Fig. 1, originally intended to be pump
fed and centrally powered by a generator whose concrete casing still
exists on the outskirts of the village. However, by the time the Khmer
Regime collapsed in 1979, the irrigation projects were mostly not
completed and during the 1980s and 1990s those which had been fin-
ished were poorly maintained and began to degrade as villagers
struggled to rebuild their lives after the war.
As a result, these vast interconected irrigation systems have in large
part been repurposed as rainwater storage in either nominally or for-
mally private hands. In Cheik, once centrally powered by a pumping
station drawing water from a neighbouring lake, a short lived farmer's
water user community [FWUC]1 has given way to private management
by a handful of villagers. In Poum, once at the edge of a similar cen-
trally powered irrigation grid, only the main canal (see Fig. 2) remains
connected to a lake beyond the village, leaving the small number of
villagers whose land is close by to organise pumping directly to their
farms where necessary. In Svay, once the hub of a large centrally
powered irrigation project intended to pump water from the adjacent
Mekong river to neighbouring villages, the derelict canal system is now
used as rainwater storage for a brief period after the rainy season.
Moreover, seeking to supplement or supplant the water access
provided by these canals, bore wells have sprung up in recent years in
ever greater numbers. These wells draw on the local aquifer at an
averge of depth of 40–60m, depending on petrol powered pumps to
raise large quantitities of water to the surface, in addition to the hor-
izontal distance to reach individual plots of land. Although officially
discouraged by the Cambodian government (RGC, 2019), using bore
wells for agricultural purposes in this way is increasingly common
across the country as a means for farmers to cope with unpredictable
rainfall. Unlike canals, they do not depend directly on recent rainfall.
Nevertheless, using them comes at a considerably higher cost than the
average $1-200 annual cost of surface irrigation, often necessitating
high levels of advance credit to faciliate.
Thus, despite the local character of its geography, local experiences
of, and responses to, the climate are inseparable from Cambodia's wider
economic development. The rapidly expanding availability of micro-
finance and remittances from migrant workers has increased rural ca-
pital to the extent that private water provision is possible. In turn, these
same processes of water of management have fed back to the uptake of
loans and the undertaking of migrations, both of which have increased
rapidly in volume in recent years (Bylander, 2015). As a result, this
nexus of migration and debt has resulted in growing entry to some of
the Kingdom's worst and most precarious forms of migrant labour, as
exemplified in particular by brick workers: the key focus of this paper.
Indeed, unlike other migrants, brick workers predominantly work
under conditions of debt bondage, following their accrual of un-
manageable debts outside of the kilns. Rooted in a desire to avoid a
formal default, those who enter the brick industry therefore do so on
the basis that a single loan from a brick kiln owner will clear all of their
existing debts, leaving them both a consolidated debt figure and the
means, in theory, to meet it. On this basis, prospective brick workers
therefore agree a contract with the kiln owner to continue to work until
their debt is cleared, a situation usually leading to long term bondage in
the industry. On average, brick workers spend almost 8 years working
in brick kilns, but many have done so for much longer, often running
into decades and incorporating widespread intergenerational bondage
(Brickell et al., 2018).
In rural discourse, those who find themselves in this position are
routinely referred to as unlucky. Yet as what follows aims to show, this
is a process with little to do with luck. The economic pressures that
1 Farmer's water user communities are an initiative encouraged by the
Cambodian government to promote shared management of common water re-
sources. However, they are rarely put in place and even more rarely functional.
Out of a total of 2525 irrigation schemes nationwide, only 230 – around 6% –
have an FWUC in place, of which only four – 0.16% of the total – are func-
tioning properly (CEDAC, 2009).
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have transformed Cambodia's rural areas have increased precarity not
at random, but according to specific geographically and socially ar-
ticulated endowments of land, hydrology and capital. Who loses their
land as a result of this process, and who retains or gains it, is thus no
accident, but the result of these endowments being expressed amidst
novel rural social and physical circumstances. Indeed, as this paper
shows, it is paramount that neither the social nor the physical
dimensions of this process are underplayed. Neither wells nor canals
emerge by accident, yet they are key components in the hydrosocial
politics of space, intertwining with both livelihoods and mobility in a
fundamental manner.
Fig. 1. Predominantly Khmer Rouge irrigation system around Poum (Open Development Cambodia, 2016).
Fig. 2. A Khmer Rouge era canal in Poum. Photograph: Sopheak Chann, 2018.
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5. Hydrosocial power in situ: irrigation, space and debt
Where the politics of water are concerned, space and scale are key.
Despite the broadly homogeneous picture of changing water regimes
and adaptation across the Kingdom as a whole, a household perspec-
tive, as exemplified in Fig. 3, reveals a far more diverse set of accounts.
Indeed, rather than indicating the geographical distribution of climate
perception that might be expected according to such a method – with
droughts perceived more by those living further from natural water
sources, for example – the spatial data indicates no clear pattern to the
perception of drought. Rather, as the figure shows, diametrically op-
posed reports of drought trends co-exist within a few metres of each
other, suggesting that drought perception on this scale is neither
homogeneous, nor related in a direct manner to residential land.
A logical response to this finding might be to hypothesize that it is
the positioning of agricultural, rather than house land that drives
drought perception. Indeed, given that access to drinking water was not
presented as a challenge by either informant villagers or local officials
or during the course of the research, the distance between water sources
and agricultural land might be expected to influence the perception of
drought more than the distance from residential land. However, map-
ping drought perception against agricultural land locations, as under-
taken in Fig. 4, produces an equally diffuse picture of its experience. In
both cases, therefore, it is not so much that there is no clear relation-
ship, but the extent of the non-relationship that is key here. Far from
demonstrating any clear spatial coherence, diametrically opposed per-
ceptions of drought trends again co-exist within a few metres of one
another.
Nevertheless, although space does not appear to play a direct role in
shaping climate change perceptions, the data support Niles and
Mueller's (2016) claim that water geography plays a role in shaping
perceptions of the changing climate. Specifically, respondents'
irrigation use correlates significantly with their perception of changes
in the last five years to wind (Spearman's= 0.296; p=0.000; insect
infestation (Spearman's=−0.503; p= 0.000); new pest species,
(Spearman's= 0.225; p= 0.002); floods, (Spearman's=−0.19;
p=0.009); and new plant species/weeds (Spearman's=−0.162;
p=0.027).
Supporting this relationship, informants' testimonies suggest that
space, irrigation and climate work in combination to shape water
availability on a household basis. As those in Cheik explained, the
ability to farm is dependent on capital investment, with irrigation in-
creasingly key to achieving a successful harvest. However, whilst ‘some
people have money to drill wells; people who don't have enough money
have to watch their rice goes bad’ (Farming Focus Group, 22/02/2018).
Those wishing to make use of a well belonging to somebody else are
therefore required to pay on credit for the service. Specifically:
‘They charge 250,000 Riel [62.5 USD] per hectare. And the harvest
fee is the same so in total it's already 500,000 Riel [125 USD], not
including the rice delivery. If the farmlands are near, they charge
500 Riel [0.125 USD] per haversack and 1000 Riel [0.25 USD] if
they are far. For example, if the land is 1 ha, it costs 100,000 riels
[25 USD] and the harvest fee is 600,000 riel [150 USD], but there is
also the expense of delivery and fertilizers. One hectare of rice
paddy can yield up to 6–7 tons of rice to sell.2 It costs up to 4 million
Riel [1000 USD] for one time and all [of this is] bought on credit.
We can't earn much profit because sometimes the rice gets infected
when there's no rain. Fertilizers, oil [petrol] and well water are not
Fig. 3. Drought perception mapped against house location in Svay.
2 N.B. The farmer here is citing this figure as a potential maximum. Mean
reported yields in the study sites are in reality far lower. In Cheik, yields
average the highest, at around 3 tonnes per hectare, whilst in Svay the figure is
under 2 and in Poum, only 0.5.
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enough [to make profit from] one hectare of farmland’ (Farming
Focus Group, 22/02/2018)
The fine margins that farmers in Cheik refer to mean that relatively
small differences in distance from a water source can make a big dif-
ference to the profitability of an agricultural plot. Thus, whilst owning a
well is not necessarily a prerequisite to a successful harvest, easy spatial
and economic access to irrigation often is. Nevertheless, even when
water is available, the cost of pumping is significant. For those whose
land is located near to a canal, it entails two separate charges: 250 Kg of
rice per hectare – or approximately 50 USD – to the water supplier (who
pumps water from the main canal to smaller canals) in addition to 60 L
of diesel, amounting to a total of 100 USD per hectare. Moreover, as a
second farmer (Bol, 22/02/2018) explained, to receive water from a
more distant canal costs 300 000 Riel [75USD] per hectare to the water
supplier in addition to another 90-150 L of diesel to transport, costing
between 72 and 120 USD. The total cost of water therefore amounts to
between 150USD and 200USD per hectare per season, against average
yields of under 2000 kg per hectare, or 500 USD at market value.
Although more reliable during periods of peak demand, the cost of
pumping from wells is higher still, adding the cost of bringing the water
to the surface to that of pumping it from the well to a farmer's agri-
cultural land. In addition, well owners often levy further charges on
well users, most commonly in the region of 2.50 USD per hour. Usually
paid on credit, this renders the use of wells yet more costly and pro-
hibitively expensive for those whose land is more distant from the well
itself.
Viewed in this context, the close association shown in Fig. 5 be-
tween household debt and irrigation – reflected also in a correlation of
0.441 (Spearman's, p= 0.000) – is unsurprising. By driving and dis-
tributing debts, the geography of water shapes local livelihoods in rural
areas. Nevertheless, the influence of irrigation is not confined to the
spatial vicinity of the agriculture it sustains. Rather, as the following
section will demonstrate, local hydrology continues to influence beha-
viour and livelihoods outside of the village itself by shaping the success
or failure of translocal livelihoods, as well as the cost of sustaining
them. By considering linkages between agricultural failure, migration,
and entrapment in debt bondage, the following section will examine
this scenario in further detail.
6. Mobilising hydrosocial power: irrigation, perception and
precarious migrant labour
As section 5 demonstrates, perceptions of the changing climate are
rooted, in part, in local environmental endowments. Yet climate per-
ceptions are also a driver of mobility. Migrant livelihoods in the con-
struction, garment and a number of informal industries are structured
by the translocal experience of sender household assets and liabilities
(see Parsons, 2017; 2016). Climate is perceived via the intermediary
factors of assets and livelihoods, often earned or possessed many miles
from the perceiver, thereby allowing the influence of hydrology to
transcend local spaces and embroiling it in complex and spatially dis-
located migrant livelihoods.
Indeed, as shown in Figs. 6 and 7, perceptions of climactic changes,
even in the relatively recent past, are a key factor in the likelihood of
migration, with both drought (Spearman's= 0.117; p=0.041) and
rainfall (Spearman's= 0.204; p=0.00) significantly correlating with
the presence of migrants in the household. This highlights the im-
portance of climate perception – essentially the climate as articulated
within a multi-scalar, power-laden milieu of assets, livelihoods and
economic structures – in shaping migration decisions. Moreover, given
that the minimum scale of data available in relation to both drought
and rainfall patterns is in general (and certainly in Cambodia) far larger
than size of a single village (Touch et al., 2017), it also highlights the
scalar shortcomings of utilising climate data as an independent variable
Fig. 4. Drought perception mapped against agricultural land in Poum.
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in the analysis of climate migration. Rather, the evidence here suggests
that intermediary spatial and socio-economic factors play a key role in
shaping the influence of the climate on mobility.
The possession or otherwise of agricultural land is one example of
this. Households possessing agricultural land are more likely than those
without to perceive changes in drought and rainfall. However,
emerging most clearly amongst these factors, climate perception ap-
pears to be most closely linked to irrigation. Moreover, as shown in
Table 1, the propensity of a household to contain migrants appears to
be closely linked to the irrigation usage of the sender household.
Households not containing migrants are therefore less likely to farm at
all, as well as being considerably less likely than any other group to use
Fig. 5. Mean household debt against irrigation usage across all three villages (N=308).
Fig. 6. Perception of changes in drought against the presence of migrants in the last 5 years (N=308).
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irrigation.
Moreover, although space, as shown above, has only limited direct
influence on climate perception at this scale, it does appear to play a
role in shaping how socio-economic factors, such as agricultural prac-
tice and irrigation use, influence that perception. Indeed, villagers’
testimonies repeatedly highlighted the influence of spatial distances on
migration decisions. Speaking of those who had migrated, for example:
‘Their farmlands, around 4-5 guntas, [0.1 to 0.125 Acres], were far
away from the wells. For us, who have around 4-5 ha of farmlands,
we could barely grow rice, so what about them?’ (Farming Focus
Group, 22/02/2018)
Moreover, as they later elaborated.
‘Those who didn't have enough water have gone to find work
[outside the village]; the people down in those fields [there]. They
only grow rice once a year using the stream water. When the stream
dries out, they cannot grow [anything] anymore. No one drills the
wells there because they cannot stay to guard the wells. Only people
who can afford to drill the wells [themselves] can have enough
water. [Only] if there are a lot of farmers in one particular place, can
they get a well. If there's no water, it's useless having farmland’
(Farming Focus Group, 22/02/2018)
These testimonies highlight the close relationship between migra-
tion and the small scale geography of irrigation. Yet beyond this binary
analysis, a relationship is in evidence also in terms of the type of
migration undertaken. In particular, there is a significant difference in
the household irrigation usage of more desirable and higher remitting
migrant groups such as garment work, construction work, petty trade
and company jobs, compared with the least desirable migrant jobs,
denoted here by brick work. As the data demonstrate, garment workers,
construction workers, company staff, or self-employed workers, are
almost twice as likely as brick workers to come from households whose
agricultural land is all or mostly rain fed, as well as being significantly
less likely to come from households whose agricultural land is irrigated.
Thus, what emerges most clearly of all is the relationship between
irrigation use and entry to the worst forms of migrant labour, denoted
here by brick work. Brick workers and villagers repeatedly emphasised
that entry to bondage in this form is not merely a question of bad luck,
but of processes closely linked to farming in a changing climate. As
villagers themselves explained, ‘people who left to work in the [brick]
factories were very poor and couldn't continue growing rice due to the
irregular rain. That is why they had to go and find a job [other than
farming]: to earn a living and as well as paying their debts' (Farming
Focus Group, 22/02/2018). Moreover, as the village chief of Poum,
summarised:
‘Yes, they had some difficulties before they went to the brick factory.
Most of them rented farmlands to grow rice paddy but it was often
unsuccessful so they were in debt. When they had no money to
survive and pay the debt, they started selling their lands and finally
moved to a brick factory. That was it. It was not about gambling or
Fig. 7. Perception of changes in rainfall against the presence of migrants in the last 5 years (N= 308).
Table 1
Migrant occupation against home village irrigation usage.
Migrant Occupation Irrigation Use
No agriculture [%] All or mostly irrigated [%] Half and half [%] All or mostly rain fed [%]
Garment worker [n= 113] 29.2 20.4 0.9 49.6
Construction worker [n= 42] 31 23.8 0 45.2
Other (e.g. company staff, petty trader etc.) [n= 57] 38.6 8.8 5.3 47.4
Brick worker [n= 68] 44.1 29.4 1.5 25
No migrants [n= 136] 61 1.5 1.5 36
L. Parsons and S. Chann Political Geography 75 (2019) 102055
9
anything; just the villagers not having a stable job and income. They
solely depended on agriculture, which didn't go well for them be-
cause of natural disasters like floods and droughts. From one year to
another, their debts kept increasing so they took their wages from
the factory to pay off the old debts in the village. [In the end]
working in a brick factory seemed to be better than [staying] in the
village because at least they [would] have stable income [there].
That's all I have to say’ (Poum Village Chief, 05/03/2018)
These testimonies highlight the centrality of water to the nexus of
debt funded agriculture, climate change and entry to bonded labour in
the brick industry. As they emphasise, brick workers households are
poorer across all asset categories than non-brick working counterparts.
Yet a focus on assets alone belies the role of space in structuring this
disadvantage. The possession of assets is only one component of vul-
nerability to unmanageable debt.
As shown in Fig. 8, the more central irrigation is to a household's
agricultural practice, the greater the proportion of brick workers in the
sample. Moreover, the geospatial data present a yet clearer picture. As
shown in Fig. 9, villagers' testimonies are correct in noting the spatial
disadvantage of brick worker households' agricultural landholdings. In
Poum, for example, brick worker household land is located discernibly
further from the ground water wells which provide the most reliable
agricultural water source, but closer to the less reliable canal system.
The quantitative data further support this relationship. As Table 2
shows, the average distance of a piece of agricultural land to its nearest
well reveals a clear difference between households containing brick
workers and those not containing them. In Cheik, this amounts to a
roughly 6% difference, whilst in Svay this rises to 13% and 19% in
Poum. Spatial distance from wells is therefore associated not only with
higher debt, but unsustainable debt of the sort that leads to brick work.
Although these differences are relatively small, their significance is
enhanced by the direct relationship between distance and the cost of
irrigation, effected via the gasoline cost of pumping water. In an agri-
cultural landscape of fine margins, these discrepancies can not only
mean the difference between profit and loss in the short term, but are
amplified over time by the compounding effects of formal and informal
interest payments.
Crucially, though, this is not a relationship that holds for other
water sources. Whilst in Svay, brick workers' agricultural land is slightly
(4.6%) further from the nearest canal than is non-brick workers' land, in
Cheik and Poum, brick workers’ agricultural land is in fact positioned
closer to a part of the canal system by 18% and 100% respectively.
Thus, those households falling into brick work are those with easier
access to the repurposed Khmer Rouge built canal systems, but sub-
stantially less able to access ground water wells, leaving them with the
choice between lower pumping cost from a less reliable water source, or
a higher cost of pumping from a more reliable one.
Given the statements recorded above concerning the relative relia-
bility of wells versus canals for irrigation, these data highlight how the
relative quality of access to irrigation determines the outcomes of
mobile as well as local responses to the changing climate. Thus, they
highlight how the outcomes of attempts to respond to the changing
climate are influenced by a combination of the spatial and social geo-
graphy of water; or otherwise put, by hydrology as articulated through
multi-scalar socio-economic inequalities. Moreover, in contributing to
migration decisions, hydrosocial power has a translocal quality to it,
influencing not only local livelihoods, but also migration decisions and
migratory outcomes across significant spatial distances.
7. Conclusion
Cambodia has long been identified as one of the world's most vul-
nerable countries to climate change, as a result of both its propensity to
floods and droughts, and its dependence on smallholder agriculture
(Halsnaes et al., 2018; Touch et al., 2017). Moreover, it is also a highly
mobile country: more than a third of the country's population is cur-
rently a migrant (UNICEF, 2018). If climate migration is to be ob-
servable anywhere, few contexts offer greater opportunity to observe its
manifestation. Nevertheless, as this paper has aimed to show, the om-
nipresence of the climate as a factor in migration decisions does not
equate to simplicity of analysis. Rather than producing clearly a ob-
servable response, the climate is perceived and responded to in myriad
contradictory ways.
In particular, this paper has sought to highlight how observations
and responses to large scale climate change are articulated by local
Fig. 8. Percentage of brick workers against type of irrigation in all three villages (N=308).
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hydrology. The functionality of a canal, the presence of a well, or
simply the distance between a plot of land and either, may make the
difference between a water shortage being readily coped with, or
spelling the end for a smallholder's farming activities. These ‘socio-
hydraulic landscapes’ (Ekers & Loftus, 2008, p. 700), both human made
and natural, shape how the climate is perceived. Consequently, changes
to the climate are not experienced or determined directly by space, but
through the lens of the social and physical geography of resources,
thereby necessitating a smaller scale, geographically embedded, per-
spective on the drivers of climate migration, in order to understand its
outcomes.
In view of its sensitivity to the intersection of material and im-
material infrastructure (Bijl, 2018; Camargo, 2017), The lens of hy-
drosocial power is presented here as an effective means to conceptualise
this process. From this standpoint, the evidence here has therefore
aimed to work towards a conception of these hydrosocial structures as
interlocuters and ‘power brokers’ (Meehan, 2014, p. 215) between cli-
mate migrants and the geography in which they live. In other words, by
considering adaptive responses to water scarcity in Cambodia from the
perspective of hydrosocial power (Boelens, 2014; Meehan, 2014; Uson
et al., 2017), it is possible to reframe climate response not as a uni-
directional impulsion on humans by their environment, but as a dia-
logue between people, the resources they depend on and the contexts in
which they are articulated.
Above all, therefore, this perspective insists on the necessity of
complexity in a debate frequently framed in binary terms. Whether
between minimalists and maximalists (Baldwin et al., 2014; Bettini,
2013; Suhrke, 1994), or between those advocating or refuting the in-
fluence of single factors on migration, debates over climate migration
have rarely given full attention to issues of power (Cote & Nightingale,
2012; Nightingale, 2017) and even more rarely sought to integrate such
considerations into analyses of spatial and geographic phenomena that
shape climate migration. The local, therefore, in both its social and
physical senses, has proved a curiously enduring absentee in a discus-
sion fixed by default at the global and regional scale.
Indeed, beyond the specific concepts and methods employed here to
observe climate migration, there is a wider issue elucidated by these
approaches concerning the scalar disjuncture between scientific cli-
mactic observation on the one hand, and the climate as it impacts on
human behaviour on the other. Simply put, climate data at the scale at
which it is collected to observe climactic phenomena is not in itself an
appropriate tool with which to accurately observe the climate's impact
on human behaviour. Not only is much smaller scale climate data ne-
cessary to do so, but also a suite of further socio-economic, geographic,
and hydrological data with which to construct the intermediary rela-
tions between global changes and local behaviours. Detail and scale, in
Fig. 9. Location of land possessed by brick workers and non-brick workers in Poum.
Table 2
Distance between agricultural land and key water sources by village.
Cheik (n= 107) Svay (n= 66) Poum (n=205)
Brick workers Non brick workers Brick workers Non brick workers Brick workers Non brick workers
Mean distance of agricultural land to well (m) 369 349 373 329 473 399
Mean distance of agricultural land to canal (m) 299 354 605 577 254 497
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sum, are key.
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